With a vote of 9-5, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier ruling dated 11 September 2009, disqualifying Rosalinda Panera as mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte. According to the majority, the previous ruling was "contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law."
The Court ruled that under the law, a candidate was defined as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy" and that "any person who files certificate of candidacy shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Ergo, when the applicable provisions of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, and read together, these provisions of Omnibus Election Code, the law does not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of the ballots until the start of the campaign period.
The Court further provides that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful."
With this decision, the Court said that "Congress has laid down the law – a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that 'any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.' Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that 'any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.'"
The Court ruled that under the law, a candidate was defined as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy" and that "any person who files certificate of candidacy shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Ergo, when the applicable provisions of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, and read together, these provisions of Omnibus Election Code, the law does not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of the ballots until the start of the campaign period.
The Court further provides that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful."
With this decision, the Court said that "Congress has laid down the law – a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that 'any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.' Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that 'any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.'"
Full Text of the Cases:
Panera v. COMELEC (En Banc Decision), G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009
Panera v. COMELEC (Resolution on MR), G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009
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